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Abstract   
 
Subsidies to residential utility customers are popular among policy makers, utility managers, and 
utility customers alike, but they are nonetheless the subject of much controversy.  Utility 
subsidies are seen as a way to help make utility service affordable for poor households and as an 
alternative mechanism for income redistribution.  These arguments in favor of subsidies are 
countered by serious concerns about their adverse effects on consumer behavior, utility 
operations, and the financial health of utilities.  Both the affordability and redistributive 
arguments for subsidies are based on the presumption that poor households benefit 
disproportionately from water and electricity subsidies, that they are well-targeted to the poor.  
This article tests this assumption by examining the extent to which the poor benefit from 
consumption and connection subsidies for water and electricity services.  Our analysis of a wide 
range of subsidy models from around the developing world shows that the most common form of 
utility subsidy – quantity-based subsidies delivered through the tariff structure– are highly 
regressive.  Geographically-targeted or means-tested subsidies do better, and in many cases have 
a progressive incidence, but large numbers of poor households remain excluded.  Low levels of 
coverage and metering severely limit the effectiveness of consumption subsidy schemes to reach 
the poor.  Simulations suggest that connection subsidies are an attractive alternative for low 
coverage areas, but only if utilities have the means and motivation to extend network access to 
poor households and only if those households choose to connect.   
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Subsidies to residential utility customers are popular among policy makers, utility managers, and utility 
customers alike, but they are the subject of much controversy.  Utility subsidies are seen as a way to help 
make utility service affordable for poor households, and to keep it affordable as governments seek to raise 
average prices to improve the financial viability of utilities and to scale back the hefty fiscal transfers 
many utilities currently receive.  They are also a social policy instrument, a mechanism for income 
redistribution.  In-kind transfers such as water and electricity subsidies have been promoted as an 
alternative mechanism of redistribution in places where administrative capacity to implement cash 
transfer programs is lacking.    
 
The arguments in favor of subsidies are countered by two primary concerns.  The first is the potential 
adverse consequences of these subsidies in terms of allocative and productive efficiency, financial 
sustainability and equity.  Subsidies engender distortions in the use of water and electricity, which can 
indirectly raise the cost of service provision.  Subsidies can also induce inefficiency in utility operations 
where utility managers face soft budget constraints.  Moreover, subsidized prices for utility service have 
produced financially weak utilities with stagnant service areas and declining service quality.  The 
endemic financial weaknesses of utilities that are not reimbursed for the subsidies offered to utility 
customers leaves many poor unconnected households facing the prospect of relying on alternative (and 
often expensive or poor quality) water and energy sources for years to come.   
 
A second concern is that they are not in fact well-targeted to the poor.  Whether water and electricity 
subsidies are a cost-effective way to reduce the cost of service for the poor (and thus raise their disposable 
incomes) depends on the degree and manner in which they are targeted.  The better targeted the subsidy, 
the lower the subsidy budget needed to provide a given discount to the poor, or alternatively the greater 
the benefit to the poor for a given subsidy budget.  Underlying both the affordability and redistributive 
arguments for subsidies described above is the presumption that poor households benefit 
disproportionately from water and electricity subsidies, that the distributional incidence of the subsidy is 
progressive.  A number of recent case studies have questioned the validity of this assumption (Pattanayak 
and Yang 2002, Prokopy 2002, Foster 2004, Wodon, Ajwad, and Siaens 2003, Robles 2001, Walker et al 
2000).  Articles assessing the efficiency and equity of increasing block tariffs used in the water supply 
sector have also questioned whether this form of residential subsidy in practice actually results in lower 
prices for the poor (Whittington 1992, Boland and Whittington 2000).  Unfortunately, the results and 
observations in these studies are not directly comparable, nor are their findings generalizable.  As a result,   3
policy makers currently have little systematic information about targeting performance on which to base 
their analysis of residential utility subsidies as a utility policy or social policy option.   
 
This article seeks to contribute to closing this gap by systematically examining the targeting performance 
of residential utility subsidies using data from 13 water utilities and 27 electricity utilities around the 
world.  A conceptual framework that decomposes the determinants of targeting performance is employed 
to identify those factors that most strongly influence the empirical results and predict targeting 
performance for various types of subsidies.  We begin with an overview of the types of utility subsidies 
that exist and their prevalence among water and electricity utilities.  The article then focuses on the 
analysis of the benefit and beneficiary targeting performance of consumption and connection subsidy 
schemes.   
 
The results indicate that the most common forms of residential utility subsidies – quantity-based 
consumption subsidies such as increasing block tariffs -- are highly regressive.  Most poor households are 
excluded from these subsidies, and the majority of benefits accrue to the non-poor.  Prospects for 
achieving a progressive incidence of subsidies are better when other targeting mechanisms are used, such 
as means-testing.  However, low levels of coverage and metering severely compromise the ability of any 
consumption subsidy scheme to reach the poor.  Where coverage of standard in-house water and 
electricity service levels is low, subsidies targeted only to consumers of lower-levels of service or 
connection subsidies are better alternatives, but the performance of these subsidy models is highly 
dependent on how poor households respond to the subsidy offer.  Even connection subsidies and service-
level targeted subsidies may not reach many poor households if price is not the principal barrier to 
connection for poor households or if demand for alternative services (such as public taps or low voltage 
electricity service) is low. 
 
Typology and prevalence of subsidies 
 
We distinguish in this analysis between two broad categories of utility subsidies – consumption subsidies and 
connection subsidies.  Consumption subsidies reduce the charge for consuming water or electricity service, 
while connection subsidies are a one-time reduction in connection charges.  Consumption subsidies are 
available only to existing utility customers. Connection subsidies are by definition for unconnected 
households only. 
 
Consumption and connection subsidies may be targeted or untargeted.  Untargeted subsidies occur when there 
is general underpricing of utility services, such as when certain costs are not passed on to customers.    4
Targeted subsidies reduce prices for only a subgroup of customers.  In practice, targeted and untargeted 
subsidies are often combined: there may be an across-the-board price subsidy for all customers, but some 
customers are targeted to receive greater discounts than others.    
 
A recent survey by Global Water Intelligence, covering water utilities in 132 major cities worldwide, revealed 
that underpricing of water services is widespread (GWI 2004).  The survey compared estimates of the average 
tariff that would be needed to achieve varying degrees of cost recovery to average tariffs actually charged for 
a large number of utilities.  The conclusion was that all surveyed water utilities in South Asia and Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, and more than half in East Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, charged average 
tariffs below what would normally be required to even cover ongoing operation and maintenance costs.  A 
similar study of electricity tariffs (Foster and Yepes 2005) found that the average tariffs in nearly a third of 
electricity utilities in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa were 
likewise probably too low to fully cover probable O&M costs.  Cost recovery was higher among both water 
and electricity utilities in Latin America, with half of the water and electricity utilities appearing to charge 
enough to recover all O&M and a portion of capital costs from consumers.  The two studies together suggest 
that any targeted water and electricity subsidies that may exist are combined with untargeted general price 
subsidies in virtually all water utilities and many electricity utilities in the developing world. 
 
The targeting of subsidies can occur in two ways.  The first is through implicit subsidy structures – elements 
of utility pricing or practice that have distributional consequences, but that do not represent an explicit 
conscious attempt to reduce the cost of service or of connection for particular customers.  Common implicit 
subsidies include the practice of charging a flat fee for service rather than using volumetric charges.  Flat fees 
do not distinguish between consumption levels and thus subsidize large-volume customers.  Illegal 
connections and inaction in the face of non-payment of bills are two other forms of implicit subsidies, which 
benefit those with illicit connections and those who do not pay their bills respectively.   
 
The second form of targeted subsidy, which we focus on in this article, is targeting through an explicit 
subsidy mechanism.  The most common type of explicit targeted subsidy in water and electricity utilities is 
the quantity-based consumption subsidy.  Increasing block tariffs (IBT) – stepped tariffs that charge an 
increasingly higher price per unit to all consumers as their consumption increases into subsequent blocks – are 
a common example.  Some (primarily electricity) utilities apply another form of quantity-based subsidy, 
termed here a volume-differentiated tariff (VDT).  VDTs are composed of two or more different tariffs (e.g. 
the first highly subsidized and the second less or not at all) to which consumers are assigned based on their 
total volume of consumption.  Our recent survey of water and electricity tariff structures in Latin America,   5
Africa, and Asia found that roughly three-quarters of utilities in both sectors include some form of quantity-
based subsidy in their residential tariff structures (Komives et al 2005). 
 
Quantity-targeting can be thought of as a form of self-selection, in the sense that individual customers 
determine how much of a subsidy they receive based on how much water or electricity they choose to 
consume.  Another form of self-selection is service-level targeting in which only those households who opt to 
use a particular lower-cost service level (e.g. public water taps) receive a subsidized connection or a subsidy 
for on-going service.  The use of service-level targeting is quite rare in the electricity sector.  In the water 
sector, it is not uncommon for utilities to provide free or reduced price water from public standposts.   
 
Another form of explicit targeting involves the use of administrative decisions to determine subsidy 
eligibility.  The decision could be to subsidize all customers in a particular demographic or employment 
group (e.g. categorical targeting of pensioners or war veterans) or those living in particular neighborhoods 
or regions (i.e. geographical targeting).  For geographic targeting to effectively identify the poor, the 
location of the household must be a reliable proxy for poverty status.  This may work well, for example, 
where poor households live together and isolated from non-poor households.   Geographic targeting is 
often found combined with an IBT or VDT.  The water tariffs in Panama City; in Merida, Venezuela; and 
in Managua, Nicaragua, for example, combine a special tariff for slum areas with a general IBT for 
residential customers (Walker et al 2000).   
 
Means-testing is a more time consuming and data-intensive approach to administrative decision-making 
about targeting.  It involves using a multi-criteria instrument to evaluate the income or poverty level of 
individual households in order to find those who are most in need of a subsidy.  One example is the 
Georgian Winter Heating Assistance Program (GWHAP), put in place in 1998 as electricity prices were 
set to increase in Georgia. This scheme provides subsidy recipients with free electricity for a fixed 
volume of kilowatt-hours per year (Lampietti et al 2003)   The Chilean water subsidy is another—and 
perhaps the most widely cited example — of a means-tested consumer utility subsidy.   The program 
subsidizes between 40 and 70 percent of up to 15 cubic meters of water for poor households.  
 
Our survey of utility tariffs and subsidies revealed little systematic information on the use of administrative 
targeting in water and electricity utilities (Komives et al 2005).  It is clear, however, that many utilities in 
Latin America at least offer separate social tariffs or special discounts for disadvantaged customers.  Use of 
categorical targeting to reach pensioners in particular is very common on Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
   6
Quantity-targeting, categorical targeting, geographical targeting, and means-tested can all be used to allocate 
either consumption subsidies or connection subsidies.   In the remainder of this article we evaluate the 
targeting performance of consumption and connection subsidies that use all of these targeting methods to 
determine subsidy eligibility and to distribute subsidy benefits. 
 
Data, measurement, and conceptual framework 
 
Data 
The data on which this study is based come from a variety of published and unpublished studies of 
subsidy performance in individual cases.  All of these studies evaluate subsidy performance using a 
combination of household survey and utility data.  In a small number of cases, we have done our own 
analysis of household survey data in order to generate a new subsidy case or expand the analysis done in a 
previous study.   
 
The final sample includes 45 cases of existing subsidy programs in water and electricity, respectively.  
The majority are quantity-based subsidies, reflecting the prevalence of this subsidy mechanism.  A 
number of simulated subsidies were also included to illustrate the differential performance of alternative 
subsidy mechanisms.  The final sample includes 45 electricity subsidies from 27 utilities, plus 32 water 
subsidy programs from 13 utilities.   Most cases are delimited by utility service area. Water utilities tend 
to serve one urban area; thus, the water cases are primarily city cases. For electricity cases, the sample 
includes a mix of national, state, and municipal cases.  Though by no means a representative sample, this 
group of subsidy cases is representative of a broad cross-section of subsidy types and utilities located in 
different geographical areas, which permits drawing more systematic conclusions than could have been 
drawn from individual case studies.   A list of the cases and the original sources for the case material can 
be found in appendices 1 and 2.  
 
Measurement of targeting performance 
The analysis of the distributional incidence of subsidies considers two dimensions of targeting 
performance: the beneficiary incidence of the subsidy and the benefit incidence.  Beneficiary incidence is 
meant to address this question, “To what extent does the subsidy reach poor households?”   The indicator 
used to measure how well utility subsidies target beneficiaries is the error of exclusion, defined as the 
percentage of poor households that do not receive the subsidy.    
 
Benefit incidence addresses the question:, “How well does the subsidy instrument target benefits to the 
poor versus other households?” To measure the benefit incidence of the subsidy, a targeting performance   7
indicator, termed Ω, measures the share of the subsidy benefits received by the poor divided by the 
proportion of the population in poverty.
1 A value of 1.00 for Ω implies that the distribution of the subsidy 
across income classes is neutral, with the share of benefits going to poor households equal to their share 
of the population. For example, if 40 percent of the population is poor, then a neutral targeting mechanism 
would deliver 40 percent of the subsidy to the poor.  Neutral targeting means that the subsidy performs no 
better than random assignment of subsidies across the entire population or than a universal subsidy that 
delivers equal benefits to all.   A value greater than 1.0 implies that the subsidy distribution is progressive, 
because the poor receive a larger share of the total benefits than their share of the population.  A 
regressive subsidy would have a Ω value below 1.00. 
 
In our analysis, subsidy recipients are defined as those customers who receive a financial subsidy – 
those customers for whom the cost of providing the service or connection they receive exceeds what 
they pay for the service. For consumption subsidies, this means CQj − Ej, where C is the average unit 
operating and capital cost of producing and distributing water or electricity, Qj is the quantity 
consumed by household j, and Ej is that household’s expenditure on utility service (that is, the utility 
bill).
2    
 
This calculation is complicated for connection subsidies, as there is no universally accepted definition 
of exactly which costs are associated with the installation of a connection and should, therefore, be 
recovered through the connection charge.   In practice, therefore, our analysis of connection subsidies 
simply assumes that the existing connection charge is an accurate reflection of the cost of connection 
(however the utility chooses to define that cost). 
 
The “poor” in this study are defined as the poorest 40 percent of households.  In some of the poorest 
countries and cities studied here, this underestimates poverty as compared to an absolute poverty line.  In 
Rwanda, for example, 60 percent of households have per capita incomes below the national poverty line.   
                                                 
1 Note that in some of the cases presented in this book, the analysis is population-weighted, so that the size of 
households is taken into account when analyzing the distributional properties of utility subsidies. In other cases, 
information on household size was unavailable or not considered in the original subsidy analysis. 
2 This approach to estimating the financial value of a consumption subsidy incorporates two important assumptions. 
The first assumption is that the unit cost of serving a customer is constant across customers. Although logic tells us 
that these cost differentials exist, the cost differences are rarely known. In practice, therefore, average cost is used to 
estimate the cost of serving any particular household.  The second assumption is that the cost of serving a customer 
is solely a function of the quantity of water or electricity consumed, and the cost increases linearly with 
consumption. This assumption is a reasonable for large volumes of consumption but may not be accurate for low 
consumption levels, as part of the cost of serving a customer is billing, metering, and providing customer service to 
that client. This may lead to underestimation of the cost of serving low-volume customers and therefore may 
underestimate the value of the subsidy those customers receive.  
   8
In other cases, 40% overestimates absolute poverty.  To test whether this definition of poverty affects the 
results, we conducted a sensitivity analysis of the poverty definition and determined that the assumed 
poverty line did not alter the findings (Komives et al 2005).  
 
Conceptual framework 
To assess key factors that influence observed targeting performance of residential subsidies, we employ a 
simple conceptual model that decomposes the benefit and beneficiary targeting performance of the 
subsidies into the factors that affect this performance.
3  The benefit targeting performance indicator, 
termed Ω, is defined as the share of subsidy benefits received by the poor (SP / SH) divided by the 
proportion of poor households in the total population (P / H) in poverty, where SP is the value of subsidies 
accruing to the poor, SH is the total value of the subsidy received by the population as a whole, P is the 
number of poor households, and H is the total number of households in the population. The Ω ratio can 
also be expressed as the average subsidy benefit per poor household, divided by the average benefit per 







= Ω , (1)       
 
The numerator and denominator, SP/P and SH/H, can each be represented as a product of six factors: 
network access rates (A), uptake rates among those with access to the network (U), targeting rates among 
those with connections (T), the rate of subsidization enjoyed by those targeted to receive the subsidy (R), 
the quantity consumed by subsidy recipients (Q) and average cost per unit (C): 
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Recalling equation 1, the benefit targeting performance indicator is then defined as the product of five 
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3 This framework is based on Angel-Urdinola and Wodon 2005 and is presented in more detail in Komives et al 
2005.   9
To understand conceptually why this is true, first consider AH  and AP, which are the share of households 
and poor households respectively that have access to the water distribution network or the electricity grid 
in their neighborhoods.  These households have potential access to the utility services, in the sense that 
they have the option of connecting.  Households without access to the network or grid do not have the 
option of using utility services, and they cannot benefit from standard utility consumption subsidies. 
 
Next consider UH|A and UP|A, the share of all households and poor households with potential access (AH and 
AP) that actually connect to the network or grid.  AH × UH|A is equal to the actual connection rate, or the 
percentage of households that are connected and use water or electricity service.   Likewise, AP × UP|A is 
equal to the actual connection rate among the poor.  Unconnected households are excluded from 
consumption subsidies. 
 
TH|U and TP|U are the share of utility service users (that is, households or poor households respectively with 
access and a connection) who are targeted (i.e. fulfill the eligibility criteria for receiving a subsidy) and, 
therefore, receive a subsidy. Where a general subsidy is provided to all residential customers, T H|U and T 
P|U would equal 1, indicating that all connection households in fact do receive the subsidy.  Alternatively, 
connected households that do not fulfill the targeting criteria would be excluded from the subsidy. 
 
The first three factors --access to the network, uptake rates, and the targeting mechanism – thus combine 
to explain who receives and who does not receive a subsidy.  The share of all households receiving the 
subsidy is equal to AH × UH|A × T H|U.  The share of poor households receiving a subsidy is AP × UP|A × T 
P|U.   The error of exclusion (defined as the share of poor households not receiving the subsidy) can be 
represented as 1 – (AP × UP|A × T P|U.).     
 
Two additional factors help determine the benefit incidence of the subsidy – the ratio of subsidy rates (R 
H|T / R P|T) and the ratio of the quantity of water or electricity consumed (QH|T / QP|T).  The rate at which 
each unit of water or electricity is subsidized for a particular customer can be calculated by dividing the 
household’s expenditure or bill (E) by the cost of providing the service the household received (Q * C).  
The average rate of subsidization across all subsidy recipients is R H|T = 1 − EH|T / (QH|T × C), where C is 
assumed to be constant across customers.   The average total value of the subsidy received by subsidy  10
recipients is R H|T × QH|T × C.  Parallel calculations can be done for the subsidy rate and value of subsidy 
received by the poor.
4 
 
The above framework addresses the distributional incidence of consumption subsidies.  A similar 
framework was employed to assess the targeting performance of connection subsidies.  When all 
unconnected households are assumed to be potential beneficiaries of connection subsidies,
5 the benefit 
targeting performance indicator Ω




























| × × × = Ω    (5) 
The first term in equation 5 (X) is the ratio of the share of poor households without connections to the 
share of nonpoor households without connections
6.  The final three terms are the targeting rate ratio of the 
connection subsidy (T
C), the ratio of connection uptake rates (U
C), and finally the subsidy rate ratio (R
C).  
The U
C ratio compares the share of poor households to the share of all households who are eligible for 
connection subsidies (those who do not initially have connections and are targeted for a connection 
subsidy) and decide to take up the offer and connect to the network.   
 
Results and findings 
 
Performance of quantity-based subsidies 
Table 1 presents a snapshot of subsidy performance for subsidy cases in the sample that rely exclusively 
on quantity-targeting.  The empirical results suggest that quantity-targeted subsidies do not effectively 
target the poor – many poor households are excluded, and the non-poor benefit disproportionately from 
the subsidies.   
 
The four water IBTs presented in Table 1 all exclude more than half of the poor households. The 
electricity IBTs in the Africa case studies fail to reach more than 70 percent of the poor. Errors of 
exclusion are somewhat lower for electricity subsidies in India, but one-third of poor households are still 
excluded in most cases.  
                                                 
4  Note that unless all households are subsidy recipients (in other words, all (a) have access to the network, (b) have 
connections to that network, and (c) qualify to be subsidy recipients on the basis of the targeting procedure used), 
the average value of the subsidy received by subsidy recipients is less than the average value of the subsidy across 
all households.  The same is true for the average value of the subsidy provided to the poor.   
5 In practice, this assumption might not hold.  For example, households in neighborhoods without access to the water 
network or electricity grid would not be able to connect unless the utility decided to extend services into their area.  
The implication of a violation of this assumption for subsidy performance is discussed in more detail below. 
6 Using the notation from the consumption subsidy example, XP is equal to 1 – (AP × UP|A) and XH  is equal to 1 – 
(AH × UH|A).  11
 
Table 1.  Performance Indicators for Quantity-Based Subsidies 
Country, city 
























rate ratio & 
quantity 
ratio 
Electricity cases             
Guatemala VDT    0.20  55.4%  73.0%  0.71  1.00  0.28 
Rwanda (S)  IBT  0.35  87.2%  32.0%  0.40  1.00  0.87 
São Tomé and 
Principe 
IBT 0.41  76.8%  42.3%  0.56  1.00  0.74 
India, Bihar  State IBTs  0.43  47.7%  67.1%  0.63  1.00  0.69 
Cape Verde  IBT  0.48  75.6%  44.1%  0.55  1.00  0.87 
Honduras VDT    0.49  56.0%  68.8%  0.65  1.12  0.68 
India, Tamil Nadu  State IBTs  0.53  15.3%  92.4%  0.91  1.01  0.58 
India, Delhi  State IBTs  0.57  9.1%  92.0%  0.98  1.01  0.58 
India, West Bengal  State IBTs  0.62  30.5%  84.4%  0.84  1.01  0.73 
India, Kerala  State IBTs  0.65  14.5%  90.8%  0.93  1.00  0.69 
India, Uttar Pradesh  State IBTs  0.66  25.8%  84.2%  0.87  1.00  0.76 
India, Maharastra  State IBTs  0.66  13.8%  89.8%  0.98  1.01  0.67 
India, Haryana  State IBTs  0.66  15.4%  92.7%  0.94  1.02  0.69 
India, Madhya Pradesh  State IBTs  0.70  12.4%  93.3%  0.94  1.00  0.74 
India, Orissa  State IBTs  0.71  40.1%  81.6%  0.80  1.01  0.87 
India, Karnataka  State IBTs  0.74  18.6%  91.2%  0.88  1.01  0.83 
India, Andra Pradesh  State IBTs  0.78  16.4%  91.3%  0.89  1.01  0.87 
Peru IBT  0.82  59.9%  78.3%  0.79  1.24  0.84 
India, Rajastan  State IBTs  0.84  20.7%  91.0%  0.91  1.02  0.90 
India, Punjab  State IBTs  0.91  13.4%  95.7%  0.97  1.07  0.88 
Hungary (S)  IBT  0.98  1.7%  100.0%  1.00  1.00  0.99 
India, Gujarat  State IBTs  1.00  21.6%  92.3%  0.93  1.08  1.00 
Water cases              
Cape Verde  IBT  0.24  89.7%  26.5%  0.39  1.00  0.63 
Nepal, Kathmandu  IBT   0.56  53.0%  65.5%  0.74  0.99  0.77 
India, Bangalore  IBT   0.66  60.5%  53.8%  0.74  1.00  0.90 
Sri Lanka  IBT  0.83  69.5%  37.4%  0.83  1.00  1.00 
Notes: S = simulated subsidy 
 
Benefit targeting results are even less impressive.  Only two of the 26 quantity-based subsidy cases come 
close to achieving a neutral subsidy distribution; the rest are all regressive or highly regressive.  The 
poorest performers are the water IBT in Cape Verde, where the poorest 40 percent of the population 
receives only 10 percent of the benefits, and the VDT for electricity in Guatemala (with a discount for all 
households consuming less than 300 kilowatt-hours per month), which manages to allocate only 8 percent 
of the benefits to the poorest 40 percent.  
 
Why do these quantity-based subsidies perform so poorly?  First, the cases with the highest errors of 
exclusion are all cases that have low coverage rates (Column 4 in Table 1).  The majority of the populace, 
including many poor households, do not benefit from the subsidy because they do not have connections.    12
 
Second, in almost all cases the poor are less likely than others to be connected and thus less likely to be 
eligible for subsidies.  This occurs either because the poor are more likely to live where no water network 
or electricity grid is present or because they are less likely than the non-poor to connect even when they 
live in proximity to a network.  Common problems that non-poor households face in connecting to the 
service are not only the cost of the connection itself, but also the cost of intra-household fixtures, 
restrictions due to tenure status, and incompatibility between the household income stream and the timing 
and format of utility payments.  This situation produces an access factor ratio <1.0 (Column 5 in Table 1), 
and thus tends to skew the distribution of consumption subsidies in most developing country settings in 
favor of the non-poor.  This “access handicap” is less pronounced in countries with near universal service 
coverage, such as the Hungarian case in our sample and many other transitional and OECD economies 
that enjoy nearly full coverage of water and electricity service. 
 
A third factor that could explain the poor performance of quantity-based subsidies is the limited extent of 
household metering.  The effective application of increasing block tariffs and VDTs requires households 
to have functioning meters to measure water and electricity use. Thus, to benefit from the subsidies 
delivered though these types of tariffs, households must have not only a connection but also a meter.
7  
Even in cities with similar coverage rates, differences in metering patterns can create huge differences in 
the pool of potential subsidy beneficiaries.  Because utilities often charge households for the installation 
and maintenance of a meter, one might expect to find that poor households with connections are less 
likely to have meters than richer households with connections.  Metering coverage patterns may thus 
accentuate coverage trends and would tend to heighten the regressive beneficiary incidence.  In 
Guatemala, for example, roughly one-quarter of all households in the poorest income quintile that have 
electricity connections do not have meters. By contrast, only 10 percent of the connected households in 
the richest quintile do not (Foster and Araujo 2004).  Unfortunately, information about the coverage of 
meters by income class is scarce, making it difficult to assess whether this finding from the Guatemala 
electricity sector extends to the water sector and to other cities and countries.
8   
 
Targeting has little effect on distributional incidence (Column 6 in Table 1): the targeting ratio (T) is 
close to 1.0 in all case but one, indicating that poor households are not more likely to be targeted to 
receive the subsidies than other households.  These findings are not surprising given that IBTs and VDTs 
                                                 
7 Quantity-based subsidies might indirectly reduce bills for unmetered households if the fixed charges for unmetered 
households are calculated on the basis of the IBT or VDT and of an assumption that unmetered households are low-
volume consumers. In this case, however, any subsidy received by unmetered households would be an implicit 
subsidy, not an explicit quantity-targeted subsidy. 
8 As a result, in our analysis, the effect of metering on subsidy performance is subsumed in the analysis of 
targeting (T).  13
are generally combined with general price subsidies for residential customers, as we saw above. In many 
instances, the price of most blocks in an IBT and the prices applied to most customer groups in a VDT are 
less than average cost.  Hence most if not all residential customers receive some subsidy regardless of 
how much water they consume. Even when the top block of an IBT exceeds average cost, the structure of 
an IBT is such that all residential customers receive a subsidy over some units of consumption. A 
household ceases to be a net subsidy recipient only when the surcharge applied to the last units consumed 
is large enough to exceed the subsidy received on the first units consumed. Because the consumption 
volume at which cost recovery prices are charged tend to be quite high (well beyond subsistence levels), 
this situation rarely occurs. In La Paz, Bolivia, in the late 1990s, for example, only 1 percent of 
households consumed enough water each month to reach the block in the IBT where the price was set at 
average cost (Komives 1999).  
 
The problem is less pronounced with a VDT because this tariff structure can be designed so that 
households consuming more than a set threshold do not receive a subsidy on any units of consumption. 
For example, in a two-block VDT structure, all units of electricity or water can be subsidized for 
households that consume less than a particular monthly threshold, with no unit subsidized for households 
that consume more than that. How high the threshold is set, however, determines how many households 
are excluded from receiving a subsidy. In the cases of VDT subsidies studied here, the threshold is set so 
high that few households are charged the unsubsidized tariff.  
  
Given the general ineffectiveness of the targeting mechanism in differentiating among poor and non-poor 
households, it is the patterns of network access, connection coverage, and metering coverage that are the 
primary determinants of the high levels of exclusion of poor households from the quantity-based 
subsidies.  The poor beneficiary targeting performance of quantity-targeted subsidies contributes to a 
regressive distribution of subsidy benefits in these cases.  To fully understand the benefit targeting 
performance of these subsidies, however, we also need to examine how the rate of subsidization received 
by poor households and the quantity of water or electricity they consume compares to the population as a 
whole (see equation 4).   Although we are not able to individually examine each factor in all cases due to 
data limitations, these two factors combined have a regressive effect on subsidy performance in most 
cases (Column 7 in Table 1).   
 
There are two reasons why IBTs and VDTs might not necessarily result in a higher rate of subsidization 
of the poor than the non-poor.  One explanation is the inclusion of fixed charges in the tariff structures.  In 
the presence of fixed charges, small-volume consumers pay a higher price per cubic meter or kwh than 
high-volume consumers.  Two forms of fixed charges are commonly used. One is a minimum  14
consumption rule which charges households for a preset minimum volume of consumption even if they 
use less. Alternatively, utilities require households to pay a fixed monthly charge on top of the volumetric 
charge. At least half of the water and electricity utilities surveyed for this study apply a minimum 
consumption rule, a fixed charge, or both (Komives et al 2005).   
 
A second reason the rates of subsidization for the poor and non-poor is similar is that the volume of 
consumption does not vary significantly among poor and non-poor households (esp. for water service).  
Figures 1 and 2 examine water and electricity consumption patterns by quintile in a variety of cases.   The 
average consumption levels in the poorest quintiles are not as different from the middle quintiles as one 
would perhaps expect.  In the electricity sector, the richer households tend to have significantly higher 
average consumption levels, while water consumption does not follow this pattern to the same degree.   
 
Where consumption patterns of the poor and the non-poor do not differ substantially, the fifth and final 
determinant of benefit targeting performance – the ratio of the average quantity consumed by poor 
subsidy recipients to the average quantity consumed by all recipients --would have no effect on benefit 
incidence.  When the poor do in fact consume less than the population as a whole (and when nearly all 
residential customers are subsidy recipients), this factor tends to decrease the size of the total subsidy 
received by poor recipients relative to the total subsidy received by the population as a whole.    
Ironically, this means that the less the poor consume relative to the non-poor the less likely the subsidy is 
to deliver the bulk of the benefits to the poor. 
 


























































































An intuitively appealing solution to this problem is to modify the tariff structure in such a way that many 
non-poor households are transformed from being subsidy recipients into net cross-subsidizers.   This 
could be done by reducing the size of the subsidized first block of an IBT or reducing the subsidy 
threshold of a VDT, while raising the rate charged in the unsubsidized portions of the tariff to more than 
average cost.  However, the prospects for significantly improving the distribution of benefits from 
quantity-targeted subsidies are slim, even with these modifications.  Revising the block sizes of the tariff 
structure will only subsidize the poor at a greater rate than the rich if there are significant differences in 
the consumption patterns of the rich and the poor.  We have seen that this is not always the case, 
especially in the water sector.  Moreover, tariff modifications do not change the base coverage conditions 
that tend to accentuate the regressivity of consumption subsidies; they have no direct effect on access, 
uptake rates, or metering rates. Households that are ineligible for the subsidies because they do not have 
metered connections will remain excluded from the subsidy.  The scope for improving targeting 
performance via changes in block size or thresholds is therefore very limited in low-coverage areas in 
particular and more limited for water than electricity. 
 
Empirical studies that simulate the distributional effect of changes in tariff structures support this 
conclusion (see Komives et al 2005 for detailed empirical results).  In the simulations of “improvements” 
to quantity-targeted subsidies evaluated for this study, beneficiary incidence remained virtually 
unchanged after the modifications. Benefit targeting performance improved in most cases but only 
produced a progressive subsidy distribution in two cases: the move from an IBT to a VDT for electricity  16
in Cape Verde, and the reduction of the first block of the water IBT in Paraguay to 5 cubic meters per 
month.  Increasing the size of the first block in Paraguay—even to just 10 cubic meters—produces a 
regressive distribution of benefits.   These findings suggest that altering tariff structures is unlikely to 
dramatically improve the targeting performance of quantity-targeted subsidies.  More fundamental 
changes – such as the elimination of general subsidies for all residential customers and the expansion of 
coverage and metering – would be needed in most cases for quantity-based subsidies to begin to achieve a 
neutral or slightly progressive distribution of subsidy benefits. 
 
Performance of other consumption subsidies 
As the potential for improving targeting performance through changes in tariff structure is quite limited, 
one alternative is to allocate the subsidy based on alternative targeting methods.  Such approaches are 
found in practice in a number of utilities.  In some cases, the quantity-based subsidies offered through 
IBTs and VDTs are combined with various forms of subsidies distributed through administrative 
selection.  In other cases, administrative selection alone is used to target consumption subsidies.  Two 
types of administrative targeting are considered here: geographic targeting and means testing. 
 
Table 2 presents the benefit and beneficiary targeting performance of existing and simulated subsidies 
using administrative targeting.  More than half of these cases achieve a slightly progressive distribution of 
subsidies (ie Ω > 1).   
 
The ratio of targeting rates presented in column 4 of this table is the principal explanation for improved 
targeting performance.  With these targeting mechanisms (and unlike quantity-based subsidies), 
connected poor households are more likely than the population of connected households as a whole to 
receive the subsidy.  The targeting efficacy of means testing is greater than geographical targeting in most 
cases, as evidence by the larger T ratio.  This superior targeting power is sufficient in a number of cases to 
offset the ‘access handicap”, the fact that poor households are less likely than others to have connections 
(column 3 of Table 2).  The cases that still have regressive distributions are those where the targeting 
mechanism is not able to direct benefits to the poorer potential subsidy recipients and where the combined 
effect of subsidy rates and quantity of water and electricity consumed by the poor and non-poor (column 
5 of Table 2) also tends to work against a progressive incidence of subsidies.   
 
The error of exclusion in many of these well-targeted subsidies tends to be rather high.  The existing 
means-tested water subsidy in Paraguay, for example, excludes 93% of the poor, and three-quarters of the 
poor do not receive the means-tested electricity subsidy in place in Georgia.  The coverage levels that 
were so important in explaining the poor targeting performance of quantity-based subsidies are only part 
of the story here.  In an attempt to exclude non-poor households through administrative targeting, many  17
poor households are also excluded.  This can be seen, for example, by comparing the error of exclusion 
for the existing water and electricity IBTs in Cape Verde (90% and 76% respectively) to the errors of 
exclusion in the simulated means tested subsidy in the same case (98% and 93%).   
 
Table 2.  Subsidy Targeting Performance - Administrative Selection 
Country, city 






















Geographic  targeting       
Electricity cases       
Colombia,  Bogota  1.10 3.7% 1.00 1.17 0.95 
Mexico  0.60  n/r  0.96 0.92 0.67 
Water cases       
Nicaragua,  Managua  1.18 5.0% 0.98 1.00 1.21 
Venezuela, Merida  1.09 0.0% 1.00 1.00 1.09 
Colombia,  Bogota  1.09 1.9% 0.99 1.08 1.02 
Paraguay, urban  1.42  98.8%  0.87 1.71 0.95 
India, Bangalore (S)  0.67  60.0%  0.74 1.00 0.92 
Nepal, Kathmandu (S)  0.60  53.0%  0.74 0.99 0.82 
Means testing       
Electricity cases       
Argentina *  1.50  94.0%  0.98  n/r  n/r 
Georgia,  Tiblisi  1.20  75.0%  n/r n/r n/r 
Colombia, Bogotá (S): means test and geographic  1.35  16.8%  1.00 1.47 0.92 
Cape Verde (S)  1.46  93.3%  0.55  3.56  0.74 
Water cases       
Argentina *  1.23  76.0%  0.95  n/r  n/r 
Chile  1.63  78.0%  0.91 1.74 1.02 
Paraguay, urban: means test, housing 
characteristics 
1.64  93.1%  0.87 1.89 1.00 
Paraguay, urban (S): means test, hh characteristics  2.14  96.0%  0.87 2.22 1.11 
Colombia, Bogota (S): means test and geographic  1.31  19.0%  0.99 1.48 0.90 
Cape Verde  (S)  1.39  98.0%  0.39  4.69  0.76 
Kathmandu  (S)  0.65  52.1%  0.74 1.00 0.89 
Bangalore  (S)  0.66  60.0%  0.74 1.00 0.90 
Notes: S equals simulation 
* Average results for provincial means-tested subsidies: analysis assumes all the eligible households are receiving the 
subsidy 
 
Another alternative to quantity based targeting is service-level targeting.  The sample of subsidy cases 
includes two examples of service-level targeting in the water sector -- public tap subsidies in Bangalore 
and in Katmandu.  In Bangalore, 24 percent of the population obtains water from public taps: 44 percent 
of the poor households and only 10 percent of the non-poor.  Poor households are four times more likely 
than non-poor households to use public taps. Likewise, in Katmandu, half of poor households and only 
one-quarter of non-poor households use public taps. That is good news for public tap subsidies, because a 
greater share of poor households than of non-poor households has opted to take advantage of this subsidy. 
The resulting benefit targeting performance indicators reflect this choice. Public tap subsidies in  18
Katmandu achieve a progressive distribution of subsidy benefits (Ω is 1.54), as do the subsidies in 
Bangalore (Ω is 2.14). Nonetheless, errors of exclusion of the subsidies are high: 72 percent of poor 
households do not receive this subsidy in Katmandu, and 61 percent do not receive it in Bangalore.  The 
error of exclusion for the public tap subsidies is thus higher than that of the IBT in place in these cities 
(see Table 1), reflecting the fact that more poor households in the city have private taps than use public 
taps. 
 
Performance of connection subsidies 
One overriding weakness of subsidies for consumption is that they exclude households that are not 
currently using the subsidized service.  With the exception of the service-level targeted subsidies, this 
means that unconnected households are left out of the pool of subsidy beneficiaries.  This “access 
handicap” severely compromises the targeting performance of consumption subsidies offered on standard 
connections.  As only unconnected households are the potential beneficiaries of connection subsidies, the 
problem that plagues consumption subsidies can work in favor of the targeting performance of connection 
subsidies.   
 
Few cases of existing connection subsidies have been studied in sufficient detail to apply the conceptual 
framework used in this study.  We therefore simulated connection subsidies using data on coverage levels 
among the poor and non-poor in all cases for which sufficient information was available.  The first 
simulations were of universal connection subsidies and assumed that all unconnected households were 
both offered and accepted subsidized connections.  The error of exclusion for these universal connection 
subsidies is solely a function of the connection rate in each country: more poor households are excluded 
in high coverage cases than in low-coverage cases.  The distribution of benefits from these universal 
connection subsidies is nearly always progressive (Komives et al 2005).  The only exceptions are 
Azerbaijan and Belarus, where non-poor households are as likely as poor households to be unconnected.   
 
This assessment of connection subsidies presumes that all potential or targeted beneficiaries could and 
would eventually be connected (or at least that households in all income deciles could and would connect 
at the same rate). There are two scenarios under which this would not be the case: (a) when not all eligible 
households choose to connect (even when offered the subsidy) and (b) when the utility does not offer a 
connection to all (i.e. network or grid is not present in proximity to the eligible households).  In either 
scenario, the future uptake rate among the poor would probably be lower than for the population as a 
whole and network or grid extension would likely favor areas where the non poor reside.    In practice, 
errors of exclusion would most likely increase and the progressivity in the distribution of benefits would 
diminish, relative to the result of the first simulations.  A simulation of the targeting performance of a  19
connection subsidy when only 50 percent of the unconnected poor households choose to or are able to 
connect predictably shows that errors of exclusion increase, and benefit targeting performance declines 
and often becomes regressive.  In sum, one cannot conclude a priori that connection subsidies will 
necessarily produce a progressive distribution of subsidy benefits.  The performance of these subsidies 
will depend on the behavior of both utilities and of households.  Nonetheless, even when only 50 percent 
of the poor choose to take up the connection subsidies, the targeting performance of the simulated 
connection subsidies is better than that of many of the consumption subsidies assessed above.  
 
Conclusions   
 
Consumer utility subsidies are a common feature of water and electricity services in the developing 
world.  General subsidies for residential customers are present in most water utilities and in half of 
electricity utilities.  These subsidies are in some cases combined with or replaced by an explicit targeted 
subsidy, which may be a quantity-targeted subsidy (such as those provided through IBTs and VDTs), a 
consumption subsidy targeted using administrative selection (geographic targeting or means testing) or 
self-selection (service-level targeting), or a connection subsidy. 
 
The most widespread form of these subsidies -- quantity-targeted subsidies -- are invariably regressive.  
Quantity-targeted subsidies perform better in situations where a higher percentage of poor households are 
connected to the utility network. Nevertheless, even with universal service coverage, subsidies delivered 
through IBTs or VDTs rarely achieve much more than distributional neutrality.   
 
The benefit targeting performance of quantity-targeted subsidies is equally poor for water and electricity, 
although for different reasons. Electricity service has a number of characteristics that favor the benefit 
targeting performance of quantity-based subsidies, including higher metering rates and better tariff 
designs (involving smaller subsistence blocks and price gradients that rise more rapidly toward cost 
recovery levels). On the other hand, consumption differentials between poor and non-poor are larger for 
electricity than for water service, allowing the non-poor to capture a larger absolute value of subsidy. 
Those two factors offset each other so that ultimate benefit targeting performance is quite similar for 
water and electricity.  
 
Although it is sometimes argued that the poor performance of quantity-based targeting could be reversed 
by improving the design of tariff structures, our study suggests that tinkering with the tariff structure does 
little to improve targeting performance.  The deficiencies of quantity-based targeting have as much to do 
with large access differentials and the consumption patterns of the poor and non-poor as they do with  20
tariff structures.  Reducing the first block of an IBT or switching from an IBT to a VDT will have the 
greatest effect in high coverage, extensively metered areas and where the tariff modifications ensure that 
many households are excluded from the subsidies or become net cross-subsidizers.  In other words, 
prospects for “improved” quantity-targeted subsidies are least favorable in the poorest countries, where 
coverage is low and where even middle and upper income households would likely resist raising charges 
to average cost. 
 
Alternative forms of targeting can contribute to an improvement in targeting performance, whether they 
are used as the sole targeting mechanism or used in combination with quantity targeting. Use of 
geographical targeting mechanisms raises the benefit targeting performance indicator Ω on average to 
0.99, which is roughly equivalent to a random distribution of subsidies. Means testing is more powerful, 
with Ω taking a strongly progressive average value of 1.31 in means-tested subsidies. However, this 
greater targeting accuracy comes at the cost of a substantial increase in the errors of exclusion.  The two 
available cases of service-level targeting through public standposts for water service suggest that this 
approach to targeting subsidies could perform well in distributional terms in some situations.  
 
These alternatives to quantity-based consumption subsidies improve targeting, but they do nothing to 
address the underlying access differential between the poor and non-poor. Hence, there is a limit on the 
extent to which targeting performance of consumption subsidies can be improved through such 
approaches, particularly in countries where a sizeable portion of the population does not have access to 
the service.   
 
In low coverage areas, connection subsidies are a promising option.  Simulations of a universal 
connection subsidy produced estimates of progressive benefit targeting performance in all cases 
considered.  Those simulations are based on the bold assumption that unconnected households in each 
income decile would connect at the same rate.  In practice, this assumption is unlikely to hold because 
utilities may face constraints in expanding their networks and poor households may face non-financial 
obstacles to connecting (such as the absence of legal tenure). Both of those considerations may 
substantially reduce the targeting performance of connection subsidies in practice.  More study of existing 
connection subsidy programs is needed to better understand connection dynamics. 
 
Given the generally poor performance of water and electricity consumption subsidies and the many 
questions about the potential of connection subsidies, it is important to ask to what extent the observed 
targeting performance undermines the objectives behind utility subsidies.  If utility subsidies are seen 
primarily as an alternative social transfer mechanism, the targeting performance of utility subsidies should  21
be evaluated in comparison with other social transfer programs.  A recent study by Coady et al (2003) 
examined the targeting performance of a wide range (cash transfers, food subsidies, public works 
programs, and social funds among others) of social transfer programs using the same benefit targeting 
performance indicator adopted in this study.  Table 3 compares the average targeting performance of the 
water and electricity subsidies in our sample to the average targeting performance of other social transfer 
programs that use the same targeting method.
9  This comparison reveals that utility subsidies targeted 
with means-testing or self-selection such as service-level targeting perform at least as well on average as 
other social programs that use the same targeting method.  These two targeting methods are, however, 
much more prevalent in other social sectors than in the realm of utility subsidies.  Targeted utility 
connection subsidies could also perform on par with alternative transfer mechanisms if potential up-take 
problems could be overcome.   
 













Water subsidies        
Existing consumption  0.60  1.05  1.36  1.84 
Simulated consumption  0.78  0.86  1.19  - 
Simulated connection  -  1.30  1.71  - 
Electricity subsidies         
Existing consumption  0.63  0.90  1.23  - 
Simulated consumption  0.64  -  1.39  - 
Other social policy instruments*  1.00  1.33  1.4  1.78 
* From Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2003) 
 
Quantity-targeted utility subsidies and subsidies using geographic targeting, on the other hand, perform 
slightly worse on average than other social transfer programs that adopt the same targeting approach.  The 
results for geographic targeting could simply be a function of differences in the composition of cases 
compared in the two studies.   
 
A second objective of water or electricity subsidies is to make or keep service affordable to the poor, 
especially as prices increase to cost recovery levels.  It is important for policy makers to recognize that 
consumption subsidies have serious drawbacks in this regard:: the leakage cost of the subsidies is high 
and many poor households do not receive any subsidy. At best, connection and consumption subsidies 
have the potential to address only one of the many factors – price – that explain why so many poor 
                                                 
9 The Coady study looked at the targeting performance of a range of social programs including cash transfers, near 
cash transfers, food subsidies, public works programs, and social funds, but contained almost no cases of utility 
subsdies..  22
households currently do not use utility services.  Utility subsidies cannot eliminate barriers such as tenure 
insecurity and may even exacerbate other problems if the utilities are not reimbursed through government 
transfers or cross-subsidies for the discounts they provide to residential customers.  Financially weak 
utilities will lack the resources to expand network service and improve service quality.   
 
Policy makers also need to recognize that subsidies are not the only instrument available for reducing the 
cost of utility service to consumers.  Reducing operating and particularly capital costs and improving 
collection rates are all important ways to bring revenues and costs closer together and thus reduce the 
tariff increases needed to achieve cost recovery.  These measures may not do away with the demand for 
utility subsidies altogether, since the gap between current tariffs and cost recovery tariffs is very large in 
many countries: tariffs could need to increase several fold in some water and electricity utilities to reach 
notional cost recovery levels.  Nonetheless, they help contain the magnitude of utility subsidies and 
address bottlenecks that could otherwise undermine the targeting performance of subsidies.   23
Appendix 1: Electricity Subsidy Cases Included in Database 
 
Location  Existing subsidy cases  Simulated subsidy cases  Year  Base study for subsidy 
analysis 
Argentina  Avg. of provincial means-tested 
subsidy* 
Discount for means-tested 
households  2002 Foster  2004 
Cape Verde  IBT with 40 kWh first block 
VDT with 40 kWh 
threshold; means-tested 
discount 





Geographically defined tariffs 
with IBTs 
Geographically defined 
tariffs with IBTs and  means 
testing 
2003  Melendez et al 2004; 
Melendez 2005 
Croatia  Uniform volumetric tariff     1998  Shkaratan 2005 
Georgia 
(Tbilisi) 
Means-tested free allowance; 
means-tested discount     2001  Lampietti et al., 2003; 
World Bank 2004. 
Guatemala  VDT with 300 kWh threshold  VDT with 100 kWh 
threshold  2000  Foster and Araujo 2004 
Honduras  VDT with 300 kWh threshold     1999  Wodon et al 2003 
Hungary         IBT  1997  Shkaratan 2005 
India (urban 
areas in each 
state) 
IBTs, with variations by each state     2001-02  Santhakumar 2004.  
Mexico  Geographically defined tariffs 
with IBTs     2002  World Bank 2004 




Uniform volumetric tariff 
VDT with 50, 40, and 20 
kWh threshold; IBT with 
50, 40, and 20 kWh first 
block 
2000-01  Angel-Urdinola et al 
2005 
Sao Tome 
and Principe  IBT with 300 kWh first block 
VDT with 300 kWh 
thresehold; IBT with 200 
kWh first block 
2000-01  Angel-Urdinola and 
Wodon 2005b 
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Appendix 2: Water Subsidy Cases Included in Database 
 





Average of provincial means-
tested subsidy* 
Discount for means-tested 
households  2002 Foster  2004 
 Cape Verde  IBT with 7m
3 first block 
VDT with 7m
3 threshold; 
Means-tested discount on 
10 m3 
2001-02  Angel-Urdinola and 
Wodon 2005a 
Chile  Means-tested discount     1998 
Gomez-Lobo and 
Contreras 2000; Gomez-





Geographically defined tariffs with 
IBTs 
Geographically defined 
tariffs with IBTs and means 
testing 
2003  Melendez et al 2004; 
Melendez 2005 
Croatia  Uniform volumetric tariff     1998  Shkaratan 2005 
India 
(Bangalore) 
Subsidy on public taps; IBT with 
25m3 first block 
Uniform volumetric tariff;  
IBT with 18m3 and 6m3 
first block; Geographically-
targeted discount; means-
tested discount  
2001 Prokopy  2002 
Nepal 
(Kathmandu) 
Subsidy on public taps; IBT with 
10m3 first block 
Uniform volumetric tariff; 




Pattanayak and Yang 
2002; Pattanayak et al., 
2001 
Nicaragua 




IBT with slum and pensioner 
discount     1998  Walker et al. 2000. 
Paraguay 
(Urban areas) 
Discount for means tested 
households (housing 
characteristics) 
IBT with 15 and 5 m
3 first 
block; geographically 
targeted discount; means 
tested discount 
2001 Robles  2001 
Sri Lanka  IBT     2003 
Pattanayak and Yang 
2005; Pattanayak et al., 
2004; Brocklehurst 2004 
Uruguay     Means-tested exemption of 
fixed charge   Ruggeri-Laderchi  2003 
Venezuela 
(Merida)  IBT with slum discount     1996  Walker et al. 2000. 
 
N o t e s :         
Data from the sources was reanalyzed in many cases in order to create comparable analysis across cases.  Thus, the results 
reported in the base study will not necessarily mirror the results reported in  this  book.      
*= Analysis assumes all the eligible households are receiving  the  subsidy      
IBT = Increasing block tariffs; VDT = Volume differentiated tariffs          25
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